About That Deal 

Concern about the nuclear agreement negotiated between the Obama White House and the Islamic regime in Iran grew over the weekend. That's not at all surprising given some headlines that emerged following Thursday's announcement. 

President Obama was quick to declare this a "good deal" and "our best option," but few are rushing to embrace his view. For example: 
 

• The Wall Street Journal ran a report last week headlined, "Concessions Fueled Iran Nuclear Talks." Those would be U.S., not Iranian, concessions. 

  The talks were meant, the Journal writes, "to dismantle most of the country's nuclear infrastructure." But Olli Heinonen, a former U.N. inspections official, said, "I'm a little puzzled by the political agreement. You're going to leave Iran as a [nuclear] threshold state." 
   

• The Washington Free Beacon reported, "Iran Brags About Nuke Concessions." According to the Beacon, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif said, "None of those measures include closing any of our facilities. We will continue enriching; we will continue research and development." 
   
• Within hours of Mr. Obama's White House press conference announcing this "good deal," the Iranians accused the president of lying. They've done that before. Zarif tweeted, "There is no need to spin using 'fact sheets' so early on." He then issued a series of tweets suggesting that U.S. and European sanctions would be lifted immediately, not gradually as Obama suggested. 
   
• Over the weekend, the New York Times wrote, "Outline Of Iran Nuclear Deal Sounds Different From Each Side." There are "some noteworthy differences," according to the Times, between the Iranian and U.S. versions of the agreement "which have raised the question of whether the two sides are entirely on the same page." 

  One foreign policy expert warned that these "noteworthy differences" will allow the Iranians to "exploit all ambiguities with creative interpretations." 
   

• Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, writes that Obama's deal "leaves unanswered at least as many questions as it resolves. . . . It is closer to the truth to say the real debate about the Iran nuclear accord is just beginning." 

  Not Verifiable 

  "Trust, but verify" was Ronald Reagan's maxim in dealing with the Soviet Union. There is no reason to trust Iran and many experts doubt this deal is verifiable.

  It is important to realize that the inspections will be conducted by the United Nations, not the United States. And the U.N. has a long record of accommodating the hostile regimes it is supposedly monitoring. 

  Moreover, the concept of inspections is based on the flawed assumption that we know where to look. Iran has hidden nuclear facilities in underground bunkers, repeatedly blocked international inspections of known sites and is very likely operating nuclear sites that we don't know about. 

  Concerns about Iran's previous attempts to weaponize is nuclear program remain unresolved. Politico quotes Jofi Joseph, a former Obama National Security Council aide, as saying, "It doesn't appear as if Iran agreed to do anything specific" regarding military applications of its nuclear research. 

  Thomas Moore, a nonproliferation expert with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, adds that the deal "allows Iran to engage in nuclear activities -- like stockpiling low-enriched uranium and operating a plutonium reactor -- that have no civilian necessity." 

  David Sullivan, a former CIA arms verification expert, asks, "Why are we negotiating for a new agreement, when existing Iranian [Non-Proliferation Treaty] violations remain in effect, ongoing and unresolved, suggesting that Iran is unlikely to comply with any new agreement?"

  Unfortunately, even our own intelligence agencies don't have the best record. On August 24, 1949, the CIA predicted that the Russians were at least four years off from testing a nuclear bomb. They detonated one five days later. 

  As national security expert James S. Robbins wrote recently, "The United States has an abysmal record at predicting when countries will go nuclear. U.S. experts have gotten it wrong every time." In addition to his Soviet example, Robbins notes we were wrong about China, Pakistan and North Korea too. 

  Who's Happy? 

  Those applauding the deal should cause us all to reconsider. Major General Hassan Firouzabadi, chief of staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, reportedly "heaped praise on the country's negotiating team" in a letter to Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

  Hezbollah is happy too. Nawar Sahli, a leader of Hezbollah in Lebanon, called the deal a victory for Iran and "global recognition of Iran as a member of the nuclear club." 

  Meanwhile, the reaction from Jerusalem is understandably grim. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Friday:

  "This deal would pose a grave danger to the region and to the world and would threaten the very survival of the State of Israel. The deal would not shut down a single nuclear facility in Iran, would not destroy a single centrifuge in Iran and will not stop R&D on Iran's advanced centrifuges. . . . 

  "The deal would lift sanctions almost immediately and this at the very time that Iran is stepping up its aggression and terror in the region and beyond the region. . . . Just two days ago, in the midst of the negotiations in Lausanne, the commander of the Basij security forces in Iran said this: 'The destruction of Israel is non-negotiable.' 

  "Well, I want to make clear to all. The survival of Israel is non-negotiable. Israel will not accept an agreement which allows a country that vows to annihilate us to develop nuclear weapons, period. 

  "In addition, Israel demands that any final agreement with Iran will include a clear and unambiguous Iranian recognition of Israel's right to exist."

  If Iran's nuclear program is truly meant for peaceful purposes, then recognizing Israel's right to exist ought to be a starting point for future talks and an easy thing for Iran to do. But it won't have to. The Obama Administration immediately rejected the prime minister's request.